Tehran, Iran – Iranian authorities have indicated a potential shift towards more offensive actions in the ongoing conflict with the United States, as a crucial Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Washington formally concludes. This hardening stance follows a period of renewed hostilities and suggests a strategic recalibration by Tehran in response to perceived threats.
Escalating Tensions and the Expiration of the MoU
The expiration of the MoU, initially intended to de-escalate tensions over the strategic Strait of Hormuz, comes as fighting between Iran and the U.S. has reignited after a brief ceasefire in June. While the agreement had already been significantly undermined by recent clashes, its official end marks a symbolic turning point, potentially paving the way for more aggressive military postures from both sides.
Brigadier General Yadollah Javani, the head of the political bureau of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), articulated this readiness for a more assertive approach. Speaking to state television, Javani stated that his forces were prepared to undertake any necessary actions to safeguard the nation. "The enemy started the war and our efforts have been defensive, although they might take on an offensive aspect," he remarked, hinting at a strategic pivot.
Iran’s Evolving Deterrence Strategy
General Javani stopped short of detailing the specific offensive measures Iran might employ, but warned that adversaries should brace for "strategic surprises." This veiled threat follows recent pronouncements from IRGC spokesman Hossein Mohebbi, who identified potential targets for retaliation should the U.S. strike Iranian civilian infrastructure. These targets reportedly include critical U.S. and regional allied infrastructure, such as energy networks, power plants, and internet-connected systems.
Within Iranian political circles and media, discussions have surfaced regarding the possibility of mounting ground incursions against U.S. interests in Bahrain and Kuwait, should Washington initiate a ground invasion of Iran. However, analysts have expressed skepticism regarding the feasibility and inherent risks of such operations, especially given the absence of any recent indications that the U.S. is planning such a move.
Supreme Leader’s Influence and Military Appointments
Iran’s increased emphasis on offensive deterrence against the United States appears to be closely linked to recent power consolidations within the Iranian hierarchy. Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, a figure known for his hardline stance, has been steadily reinforcing his authority by appointing several seasoned IRGC veterans and trusted confidants to key military and security positions.
This strategic reshuffling culminated in the appointment of Major General Ahmad Vahidi as the new commander-in-chief of the IRGC. Khamenei framed Vahidi’s promotion as a mandate for a dual strategy of "maximum deterrence" coupled with a readiness for "powerful offensive operations against the enemy." This directive underscores a commitment to both defensive preparedness and proactive engagement.
Historical Context and Rhetoric of Victory
Major General Vahidi himself has spoken of Iran’s military achievements, asserting that under Khamenei’s leadership, the Iranian armed forces managed to "bring to its knees the most heavily-armed army in world history." This assertion stems from Iran’s portrayal of the conflict following U.S. and Israeli airstrikes on February 28, which ignited fierce fighting.
In stark contrast, U.S. President Donald Trump reiterated his claim on Friday that Iran had been defeated in the war, citing a naval blockade as a "wall of steel." He also provocatively suggested that the Strait of Hormuz would soon be declared U.S. territory. While the White House later characterized this comment as a joke, the inflammatory rhetoric has clearly resonated within Tehran.
Retaliatory Measures and Economic Warfare
Reacting to President Trump’s remarks, Iran’s army chief, Amir Hatami, announced a substantial reward for any individual who captures or kills a U.S. soldier involved in a ground operation on Iranian soil. Men would receive $30,000, while women would be eligible for double that amount. "Our hands are open in terms of reaching the aggressors and they will become more open through our initiatives," Hatami stated, referencing recent Iranian attacks on U.S. forces in Jordan.
Mohsen Rezaee, the influential secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council, has suggested that the Trump administration may have contemplated ground operations within Iran but ultimately refrained due to what he described as "half-baked plans." Rezaee posited that the U.S. Central Command’s decision to target approximately 50 cities across 15 provinces during the July flare-up, rather than focusing on Tehran or northern Iran, was a precursor to a potential ground assault aimed at controlling the Strait of Hormuz and possibly reaching nuclear facilities in Isfahan.
Strategic Targets and Defensive Preparations
Rezaee elaborated on the U.S. military’s alleged targeting of critical infrastructure such as bridges, roads, maritime control towers, radar systems, and coastal installations. The purported objective was to sever logistical supply lines to southern Iran. He further argued that a successful ground invasion to seize control of the Strait of Hormuz would require a force of at least 100,000 soldiers, a logistical undertaking that would necessitate crossing the formidable Zagros Mountains and traversing Fars province.
In anticipation of such scenarios, Iranian media and military commanders have reported on defensive measures being implemented across southern Iran, particularly around critical oil export terminals like Kharg Island. Rapid-response units have reportedly been deployed to reinforce territories bordering the Strait of Hormuz. Army spokesman Mohammad-Reza Akraminia emphasized the commitment to preventing any foreign troop landings on Iranian soil, stating, "If the Americans enter one of our islands, we will certainly target them on our own islands, let alone on other countries’ soil."
Authorities have also signaled preparedness for potential unrest orchestrated by separatist groups near Iran’s western borders with Iraq and Turkey, as well as in the east along the borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan. The IRGC is reported to have bolstered defenses in these regions and continues to conduct missile and drone strikes against armed groups operating in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Iran’s Stance on the Expired MoU and Diplomatic Efforts
Despite the heightened military rhetoric, Iranian officials have downplayed the significance of the MoU’s expiration. Brigadier General Javani reiterated in a separate interview that the full reopening of the Strait of Hormuz is contingent upon Washington fulfilling its commitments under the original agreement.
Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs clarified that the MoU did not explicitly stipulate a two-month window for halting hostilities and dismissed the expiration as having no particular bearing on the conflict or ongoing diplomatic talks with Oman regarding the Strait. "It has been proven many times that the Islamic Republic of Iran is not a party to devise its policies under pressure, ultimatums and deadlines. We decide based on our evaluations of what guarantees national interests and security," stated a ministry spokesperson, Baghaei.
Baghaei attributed the delays in reaching an agreement with Oman on the partial reopening of Hormuz to legal and technical complexities, the involvement of multiple stakeholders, and the actions of "ill-wishing parties" seeking to disrupt the process.
A Declaration of Diplomatic and Military Victory
Parliament speaker and chief negotiator, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, characterized the expired MoU as a "document of pride and victory in the field of diplomacy." He asserted that the Islamic Republic had emerged "victorious," both politically and militarily, from the war with the U.S. and Israel.
"I don’t mean that we destroyed their armies, I mean that they attacked us while clearly and repeatedly citing nine objectives, but did not achieve any of these goals at any level. That was the biggest abject failure for the U.S. and the Zionist regime," Ghalibaf declared. Despite these pronouncements of success, Ghalibaf has yet to secure a consensus within the Iranian leadership for a long-term diplomatic resolution to end the protracted conflict with the United States.
