Iranian authorities are increasingly highlighting arrests and clashes involving small armed cells within the country and skirmishes along its borders, a narrative amplified in the lead-up to and during the ongoing conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States. This focus on internal security challenges serves a dual purpose for Tehran: framing the broader regional war as a national security struggle and projecting an image of control and deterrence to both domestic and international audiences. The latest publicized incident involved the arrest of an eight-member network allegedly linked to "anti-revolutionary" and "pro-monarchy" factions, according to state media reports.
The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in Fars province accused the apprehended individuals of using incendiary devices, such as Molotov cocktails, and setting tires ablaze during nationwide protests that occurred in January. This action comes amid rising public discontent fueled by deteriorating economic conditions, a concern recently voiced by Iran’s leadership. The government faces mounting pressure to address widespread dissatisfaction, which could potentially translate into further demonstrations.
The Resurgence of Monarchist Rhetoric
The recent emphasis on "monarchists" within state media narratives is directly tied to public sentiment expressed during the January protests and on social media platforms. A segment of the Iranian population has voiced support for the restoration of the country’s monarchy, which was overthrown by the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Reza Pahlavi, the son of the last Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and a prominent exile opponent of the current Iranian government, actively encouraged nationwide strikes and protests in January. While thousands are believed to have perished during these unrests, and instances of public chanting in support of Pahlavi have been noted within Iran, there is currently no evidence of significant, organized pro-monarchy armed groups operating domestically.
The broader context of these nationwide demonstrations, which have swept Iran in recent years, primarily stems from economic grievances and widespread discontent over repression. The calls for a return to monarchy have been more pronounced in demonstrations held outside of Iran. However, the Iranian government has responded by announcing a substantial number of arrests of individuals it claims are monarchist sympathizers. Notably, on March 18, the Intelligence Ministry reported the dismantling of 111 alleged "monarchist cells" across 26 provinces. Iranian authorities have characterized the January protests as a "coup" orchestrated by armed agents of the United States and Israel, with pro-monarchist elements purportedly involved. International bodies, including the United Nations, and human rights organizations have condemned the Iranian state forces for their brutal crackdown on protesters. The judiciary has since executed dozens of individuals, including some who participated in the January demonstrations. Numerous other citizens, including students, artists, business professionals, journalists, and healthcare workers, have been detained in recent months for actions deemed by the authorities to be threats to national security.
Identifying Iran’s Principal Armed Opposition
Beyond the state’s focus on perceived internal threats, Iran faces more substantial armed challenges, particularly from Kurdish fighters operating near its western borders with Iraq. These groups, designated as "terrorist" outfits by Tehran, have been based in the semi-autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq for years. Iran’s military has conducted strikes against these bases and has engaged in security cooperation with the Iraqi government to curb their activities.
At the outset of the current conflict, the Trump administration reportedly considered leveraging these Kurdish armed groups for a limited ground operation in western Iran, intended to complement aerial bombardments by U.S. and Israeli forces. Reports from early March indicated that between 5,000 and 8,000 Iranian Kurdish fighters from groups such as the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), the Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan (PDKI), and the Kurdistan Freedom Party (PAK) were preparing for a potential cross-border incursion. These groups reportedly held discussions with U.S. and Israeli representatives.
However, these groups cited a lack of adequate weaponry and an unclear directive from Washington as reasons for not initiating the operation. The plan was ultimately shelved, and by April, the IRGC had reportedly reinforced its troop presence in the border provinces. Former President Trump has since claimed to have supplied arms to Kurdish forces, a statement that Kurdish groups have denied, asserting they retained the weapons for their own defense.
The Baloch Insurgency and External Support
Another significant armed challenge to Iranian authorities emanates from the southeastern border regions, an area home to disenfranchised and restive Baloch populations. Separatist Baloch fighters are active in this strategically important and often volatile region. In late August, security forces announced the disruption of a cell belonging to Jaish al-Adl, the most prominent of the Baloch armed organizations. Reports indicated one fighter was killed, six were apprehended, and a cache of weapons, including rifles, grenade launchers, and explosives, was seized. Despite these actions, sporadic attacks by the group continue, with reported casualties among police officers and IRGC personnel. Iranian authorities have pledged to enhance border security measures to mitigate the threat posed by these armed groups amidst the ongoing war.
Alex Vatanka, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, suggests that external support for the Kurdish and Baloch rebel groups could significantly amplify the security challenges for Iranian authorities. He posits that in the current wartime context, any increase in external backing for ethnic militants might be perceived by the Iranian state as an existential threat. Vatanka believes that ethnic militant groups could become decisive players only if they are part of a broader, externally funded effort to destabilize the regime in Tehran, a scenario that the Islamic Republic anticipates and labels as a foreign-led hybrid warfare campaign.
Trita Parsi, co-founder of the Quincy Institute, offers a similar perspective, noting that while separatist militias may not pose an immediate existential threat to the government, they could become "tremendously problematic" for Tehran if the conflict with the U.S. escalates, particularly if Washington decides to deploy ground troops. Parsi suggests that if former President Trump were to accept military risks after the midterm elections, such as deploying ground forces, it is highly conceivable that the U.S. would seek to utilize armed militias operating within Iran.
Washington’s Stance on Internal Pressure
During the January protests, then-President Trump and other U.S. officials publicly supported the Iranian demonstrators, encouraging their pursuit of the overthrow of the Islamic Republic. Similar rhetoric has persisted since the commencement of the current conflict. In recent weeks, President Trump has discussed the potential for sustained pressure—through war, sanctions, and a naval blockade of Iran’s southern ports—to instigate an internal uprising or even lead to the collapse of the current establishment.
U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the accumulated pressure could compel Iranians to take to the streets once more and potentially create divisions within the IRGC. Bessent cited severe economic conditions, including 100% inflation, long queues for essential goods, and reports of unpaid military personnel and a panicked central bank governor, as factors that could contribute to public unrest. The U.S. administration appears to be strategically leveraging both external military pressure and internal discontent as key components of its strategy towards Iran.
